Reforming an Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience

This paper presents a case study on reforming a very dysfunctional labour market with a deep insider-outsider divide, namely the Spanish case. We show how a dual market, with permanent and temporary employees makes real reform much harder, and leads to purely marginal changes that do not alter the fundamental features of labour market institutions. While the Great Recession and the start of the sovereign debt crisis triggered two labour reforms, the political economy equilibrium has not allowed them to be transformational enough.


Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the world economy has been subject to the twin forces of growing globalization and technological progress. European countries have tried to adapt labor market institutions to the changes associated with those shocks. The strategy in many of those economies has been to introduce labor market flexibility at the margin, by widening the scope of so-called atypical employment, through temporary and part-time contracts.
This, together with the high rates of unionization or coverage of collective bargaining prevailing in these countries, has exacerbated the insider-outsider divide in their labor markets. The latter term comes from the insider-outsider model, which explains how unemployment can arise when working conditions, and wages in particular, are determined by taking into account only the interests of employed insiders, thus disregarding the interests of unemployed outsiders. 1 Though in most instances the introduction of flexibility at the margin was perceived as a transitory measure aimed at counteracting the negative employment consequences of the recessions during the early 1980s and early 1990s, the incidence of atypical employment has continuously increased: in 1980 the temporary employment rate among employees in Europe was around 7.5%, now it is around 14%, reaching maximum values in Portugal (23%) and Spain (25%).
The expansion of 1995-2006 drew attention away from unemployment, but the impact of the financial crisis, the employment consequences of the Great Recession, and the need for supply policies to promote long-term growth in Europe in the context of European Monetary Union (EMU), have again shifted the focus towards new labor market reforms.
While the drawbacks of atypical employment were blurred by the boom, with the recession the empirical evidence on its negative economic and social effects has become more salient, so that the need for a different type of labor market reform has become increasingly evident. 2 Given past experience, this time the dualism strategy seems discredited and some proposals have started to explore new routes, which are geared towards making labor market regulation more efficient, flexible, and simple. 3 These proposals, however, face the difficulty of eliminating an insider-outsider divide that, in some countries, has become entrenched. The reason for its equilibrium nature is that it is beneficial to particular groups of workers and employers, mostly represented by unions and employer associations with institutional recognition and political power.
In this regards, this paper revisits the Spanish case. Building upon a large stream of previous studies on labor market reforms in this country, we now discuss the Spanish labor market performance during the Great Recession (Section 2), highlight the main institutional peculiarities that give rise to an extreme insider-outsider labor market in Spain (Section 3), address some elements of the political economy of labor market reforms (Section 4), describe and assess (negatively) the Spanish labor market reforms undertaken in the midst of the crisis (Section 5), and review some of the recent proposals to reform the Spanish labor market (Section 6). We conclude (Section 7) with some comments on the priority that labor market reforms should have in the program of structural reforms that the Spanish economy urgently needs at the current juncture.

Labor market performance in the Great Recession
During last few decades, the Spanish labor market has shown clear signs of a dysfunctional performance. The Spanish unemployment rate has not only been permanently among the highest in the OECD, but it has also experienced staggering swings: as Figure 1 illustrates, starting from around 5% in 1978, the (OECD harmonised) unemployment rate reached a peak above 17% in 1985, fell back to around 13% in 1990, only to shoot up again to more than 19% in 1994. During the long expansion of 1995-2006, the unemployment rate decreased to 8% in 2007. Nowadays, after the huge employment impact of the financial crisis, it is again close to 21%. As shown in the graph, these are much wider fluctuations than those experienced by France, which is representative of the Eurozone average. The cyclical features of the Spanish labor market are also remarkable. Labor productivity and real wages are strongly countercyclical, in part due to employment composition effects derived from the high incidence of temporary contracts, since they are typically associated to low-wage/productivity jobs which are easily created in expansions and quickly destroyed in downturns. Moreover, despite high firing costs for permanent contracts, employment is highly volatile, even more than in countries with low employment adjustment costs. 4 Bentolila and Jimeno (2006)  From 2001 to 2007, two key factors supported employment growth. The first one was a significant expansion of credit, induced by the fall in interest rates that followed Spain's accession to EMU and, more broadly, by a pervasive relaxation in the conditions of access to credit. The second factor was a very large immigration inflow which, attracted by the growing specialization of the Spanish economy in low value added and highly laborintensive industries (construction, tourism, personal services) as a result of the investment boom, has substantially modified the demographic structure of the Spanish population.
These being the driving forces, growth could not be sustained permanently. Moreover, both labor and total factor productivity growth were very low, and important distortions in the domestic labor and product markets persisted, so that competitiveness deteriorated significantly. This, together with the sharp increase in private sector indebtedness, led to the Spanish economy being increasingly dependent of external financing (the current account deficit reached 10% of GDP in 2007), a situation which made it especially vul-nerable in the subsequent global financial crisis. Despite these weaknesses, the impact of the financial crisis in Spain was, at least initially, not larger than in other European Union (EU) countries. As illustrated in Figure 2 the cumulative decline in GDP during 2008Q2-2009Q2 was equal to 4.4%, below the EU14 average (i.e. EU15 minus Spain).
The cross-country variation of the growth impact of the crisis is rooted in the nature of the expansion during the preceding period and, hence, in the sectorial specialization when the crisis hit. In countries with high private sector indebtedness, housing was by far the largest component of household wealth (80% of all assets in the Spanish case 5 ) and a high share of productive resources were devoted to the construction industry. When a housing bust followed the housing boom, there was a large negative demand shock, derived from the loss of wealth, and also a negative supply shock, linked to the past accumulation of inputs in now highly unproductive industries. Hence, in these countries the financial crisis had significant and long-lasting effects on economic activity. By contrast, in countries where housing prices did not grow much, the sectoral allocation of resources was not distorted by credit conditions, and households were not much in debt. Therefore, the main impact of the crisis was only a temporary fall in aggregate demand, stemming from a significant fall in exports that took place when, following the Lehman Brothers episode (15 September 2008), the financial crisis became systemic and disrupted world trade over 2008Q4-2009Q1. Hence, these countries also had a significant fall in GDP, but it was apparently less persistent.
As is evident from Figure 2, during the 2008Q2-2009Q2 period, the cumulative GDP loss in Spain was much smaller than the employment loss, which was equal to 7%, surpassed only by Ireland. It is often argued that the huge employment-GDP elasticity is due to large employment losses in the construction industry. Figure 3 shows that there is in-  holds when the construction industry is excluded. Hence, this evidence suggests that the main culprit for the large impact on employment must be found elsewhere.
In our search for alternative explanations, we can analyze the role of different factors underlying cross-country variation in the employment impact of the Great Recession.
While it is true that the rise of unemployment has been largest in countries experiencing housing booms and external imbalances during the expansion, 6 it is also the case that the so-called Okun coefficient relating unemployment changes to output growth has recently been out of line with its historical values in many countries. Spain, in particular, is one of the countries where employment growth has been much lower and the rise of unemployment has been much larger than expected given the size of the decline of output. 7 To examine the Okun coefficient, it is useful to decompose the variation of unemployment as follows. 8 Given than u ≈ − ln e, where u denotes the unemployment rate and e the ratio of employment (N) to the labor force (LF ), and that where H denotes working hours and Y is GDP, we have the following approximate identity ∆u ≈ −∆ ln Y + ∆ ln(Y/H) + ∆ ln(H/N) + ∆ ln(LF ) Table 1 gives the figures corresponding to this breakdown during the first phase of the financial crisis (2008Q1-2009Q4) for the US, Germany, and Spain. According to the previous identity, the change in the unemployment rate (first row) is the sum of the growth rates of output, productivity per hour worked, hours per worker, and the labor force (rows 2 to 5). This decomposition reveals the reasons why the change in the Spanish unemployment rate during the period 2008-2009 has been twice as high as in the US. First, the decline in output in Spain has been more than twice the fall in the US. Moreover, increases in productivity, hours per worker, and the labor force have also pushed unemployment up. The rise in the labor force, in contrast with the boom, is largely not due to immigration but, more likely, to added worker effects. 9 This evolution also contrasts with that of the German labor market where, with a larger decline in output than in Spain, unemployment decreased due to a reduction in labor productivity, hours per worker, and the labor force The fact that productivity is countercyclical and that wages and hours worked do not adjust in the aftermath of negative shocks in Spain are, to a large extent, the consequences of the institutional framework of the Spanish labor market, which we sketch in the following section.

An insider-outsider labor market
The Spanish labor market is characterized by marked dualism. In order to show how this situation came about, in this section we describe the main institutional features of EPL and collective bargaining in Spain, and then discuss the role of their interaction in generating an insider-outsider labor market.

Employment protection legislation
At the end of the Franco regime in late 1975, severance pay was very high, judicial protection was very stringent, unemployment insurance was very low and limited, and there was no collective bargaining. The main labor market institutions under the new democratic regime were established in 1980 Workers' Statute which, in order to attract union support for a smooth political transition process, maintained the existing employment protection rules, extended unemployment insurance and made it more generous, and established collective bargaining.
The dual approach to EPL in Spain started in 1984, when fixed-term contracts were liberalized, so that, at that time, firms could hire fixed-term employees subject a low Thus, there was a large gap in EPL between permanent and temporary jobs, collective dismissals required administrative approval (de facto not granted without an agreement with worker representatives), economic reasons for fair dismissals included in the law were quite limited, and labor courts had a very restrictive reading of those reasons. Moreover, constraints on internal flexibility, arising from regulations on geographic and functional mobility of employees were also strongly binding. Thus, it is not surprising that soon after the reform almost all hires were conducted under fixed-term contracts and that the incidence of temporary workers exceeded 30% of all employees in the early 1990s.
In view of this dramatic burst of temporary jobs, a long sequence of countervailing EPL reforms have subsequently taken place since 1994 in order to reduce the incidence of temporary jobs. All of these reforms share, to some extent, two common features. 10 First, the conditions for the use of fixed-term contracts have been restricted, although temporary work agencies have been allowed to operate since 1994. Secondly, severance pay for permanent employees has been gradually and mildly reduced. This has been done through several measures. First, 1997 saw the creation of so-called employment-promotion permanent contracts, entailing lower severance pay in case of unfair dismissal (33 days' wages p.y.o.s. with a maximum of 24 months' wages), yet targeted to specific groups of workers with lower employment opportunities and excluding most prime-age (30)(31)(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)(41)(42)(43)(44) y.o.) employees. Second, in 2002, in case of unfair dismissal, firms were allowed to avoid going to court if they deposited the penalty severance rate and the worker accepted it (thus avoiding also advance notice, the payment of interim wages, and uncertainty on the outcome in court). Then there were also a myriad of small changes in EPL throughout the period. firms either directly hiring with, or converting temporary into, permanent contracts. The rebates ranged from 40% to 60% during the first two years of contracts used to hire workers in some targeted groups (youth, long-term unemployed, and women underrepresented in some industries). However, since social security contributions are reduced only for a limited initial period (typically up to 3 years), it has been common for firms to fire workers as soon as the subsidy expired, so that there are significant increases in separation rates caused by the subsidy for most groups of workers, especially over the first year (García Pérez and Rebollo Sanz, 2009). As a result, turnover in employment-promotion permanent contracts is much higher than in standard permanent contracts.
Several labor market reforms (in 1994, 1997, 2002, 2006) have played around with combinations of these. They aimed at fighting the prevalence of temporary employment, but they turned out no to be very successful since, by the mid-2000s, the share of temporary workers still remained very high (33.5% of employees), with a large number of contracts being signed each year, more that 20 times the flow of net new jobs, and a low conversion rate into open-ended contracts, around 6% of the total number of contracts.
This churning creates an sizeable welfare loss due to the high uncertainty associated with temporary contracts, but it also creates a host of other negative effects.
On the efficiency front, Spain has suffered for more than a decade negative Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth and this is in part related to temporary contracts. Dolado year), only 23% of temporary employees did. 11 Last but not least, while temporary contracts were initially limited to younger workers, they are now widespread also among adults. Figure 5 shows that, over the period 2005Q1-2007Q3 (the end of the boom), 80% of workers aged 16-19 had a temporary contract and 11 Source: Encuesta de Calidad de Vida en el Trabajo (Quality of Life at Work Survey). We are grateful to Florentino Felgueroso for providing us with these data. that the temporary employment share falls, but 32% of workers in their thirties were still in temporary jobs and 24% of those in their fourties. This profile falls even less among the least skilled. This finding throws into sharp relief the idea that temporary contracts have largely destroyed the expectations of a professional career for Spanish workers.
Since the peak in 2006Q3, at 34.6%, there has been a substantial reduction in the temporary employment rate of about 10 pp. Part of this drop can be attributed to the huge destruction of temporary jobs in the construction industry, due to the bursting of the housing bubble since the beginning of 2008. In particular, from 2008Q1 to 2011Q2, 60% of all temporary jobs were lost in net terms (650,000 jobs). As a reaction to the huge employment impact of the crisis, there has been another recent reform of EPL in 2010, which we discuss below. Summing up, despite all these countervailing reforms, the dual nature of EPL is still very pronounced in Spain and firms continue finding it more profitable to hire new workers under fixed-term contracts, despite all the inefficiencies generated by a clearly excessive worker turnover.

Collective bargaining
Besides dual EPL, the social partners, i.e. labor unions and employers associations, support the insider-outsider model by exploiting collusion opportunities provided by the regulation of collective bargaining. This labor market institution exhibits the following features: 12 (a) high coverage, around 80% of workers, though not so high as in Nordic countries, (b) an intermediate degree of coordination, with collective bargaining agreements being signed predominantly at the industry level though with some geographical decentralization (mostly at the province level), (c) erga omnes extension of collective bargaining agreements, namely, that they automatically apply to all workers and firms within their scope, (d) frequent wage indexation rules, applying to around 65% of employees, and (e) frequent social pacts between the major trade unions and employers' association, with some guidelines for wage increases. 13 12 A comprehensive source on the institutional characteristics of collective bargaining is the ICTWSS, see Visser (2011). 13 The latest agreement of this type was struck in 2009 for the period 2010-2012.
As for unions, affiliation is very low in Spain, around 15-20%, being larger in the public sector than in the private sector. Focusing only on the latter, there are large discrepancies according to contract type; for example, the affiliation rate is equal to 18.6% among permanent workers, but only to 7.8% among temporary workers. It also increases with age, going from 3% of permanent employees aged 16-24 to 25.5% of those aged 55-64.
A similar increase is observed with seniority and with firm size, from 7% of permanent employees at firms with 1-10 employees to 31.8% for those at firms over 250 employees do not react much to changes in firm-specific productivity, while, due to the prevalence of wage indexation rules, they quickly adjust to increases in inflation. As a result, real wages -and relative wages across industries-display a high degree of rigidity.

Interactions between EPL and collective bargaining
The Spanish labor market stands out as an extreme case of a dual labor market in which the insider-outsider divide is very pronounced. There are two fundamental reasons. The first one lies with some peculiarities of employment protection legislation, which gives rise to a very high incidence of fixed-term jobs and to the concentration of worker turnover in very particular segments of the labor market. The second is the automatic extension of collective bargaining agreements to all firms, regardless of the representativeness of the employer confederation signing the agreement and the economic and financial situation of the affected firms. This gives rise to two types of workers, and also two types of firms.
First, there are workers employed under the regular (full-time, open-ended) contracts subject to high firing cost and covered by collective bargaining agreements that protect wages and employment conditions against inflation and adverse productivity shocks. By contrast, workers under fixed-term contracts (among which youths, women, and lowskill workers are overrepresented) can be easily dismissed, so that they suffer the main burden of the adjustment to productivity or demand shocks. Regarding firms, large and high-productivity firms are less constrained by these regulations, as for them firm-level bargaining is more accessible and wage levels are often above those set in industry-level collective agreements. At the same time they can use these levels as a barrier to entry and an instrument to reduce competition from smaller companies. Small and low-productivity firms are much more constrained by industry-level collective bargaining, and therefore their prospects for growth are more limited.
Thus, while the insider-outsider models of unemployment mentioned in the introduction associate insiders with employees and outsiders with the unemployed, in a two-tier labor market this partition is not right, since temporary workers have very little employment protection and therefore suffer very high turnover. As a result, they typically have a weak attachment to each individual firm, so that it is natural for their interests to be neglected by permanent employees. Therefore, the interaction between the collective bargaining regulation and EPL affords unions and employer confederations very powerful instruments to reinforce the insider-outsider divide. For example, Jimeno and Toharia (1996) found that incentives to exert effort and avoid absenteeism were relatively higher for temporary workers who, given their very low firing costs, feel the threat of dismissal much more than permanent workers. And Bentolila and Dolado (1994) found that, using temporary workers as a buffer against employment destruction, insiders can increase their wages without putting their jobs at risk.
Many studies on wage dynamics have found that nominal wage growth in industrywide agreements is essentially determined by inflation, and, on the other hand, that wages hardly respond to productivity changes and respond only mildly to changes in unemployment. 15 Thus, massive employment losses during the Great Recession, since they have fallen to a large extent on temporary workers, have not triggered wage moderation.

The political economy of labor market reform
Structural reforms are usually hard to carry out. The reason is that there always exist population groups that are negatively affected by reforms and thus try to block or soften them. As a result, reforms require some political majority and certain economic conditions to materialize. 16 The last pre-Great Recession major labor market reform in Spain took place in 1997, with an isolated (but eventually important) reform in 2002. This is not so surprising since the boom lasted from 1997 to 2007, and there is usually little incentive for politicians to reform in expansionary phases. However, the unemployment rate surged from 8% in 2007Q3 to 17.4% in 2009Q1, and yet it took until June 2010 for the first labor reform during the Great Recession to happen. We now discuss why and how that reform and other measures that followed were undertaken. We start by reviewing the literature on the determinants of structural reforms and then discuss the specificities of the Spanish setting. 15 For instance, Bentolila et al. (2010) found that a 1% upward deviation from the reference expected inflation rate, which was around 2% in the latter part of the boom, is associated with a 1.1% increase in nominal wages, whereas a 1% downward deviation is associated with a 0.3% fall in nominal wages. They also found that a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment only reduces wages by 0.2% and that there is no significant association of wage growth with productivity growth. 16 See Saint-Paul (2000).

What factors trigger reform?
The literature on the timing of structural reforms has not yet provided a set of strong and widely accepted factors that are conducive to reform. We therefore provide a very brief review of a few representative results found in the literature. (2002) finds that the relationship of the business cycle with the timing of labor market reforms is not robust, except for marginal reforms -i.e. those that do not strongly alter labor market institutions-and for two-tier reforms that only affect the flexible tier of the market, e.g. fixed-term contracts. An important finding is the exposure effect, namely that reforms happen when unemployment is rising, not just when it is high, so that insider workers are in danger of losing their jobs. Another interesting result that across-the-board reforms are mostly undertaken by right-wing governments. Duval and Elmeskov (2005), referring to structural reforms in general, find that economic crises and high unemployment do induce reforms. Somewhat surprisingly, they also find that absence of monetary policy autonomy is associated with lower structural reform activity. 17 Other results are that a sound fiscal balance may help undertaking reforms and that reforming one area (say the product market) helps reform in other areas.

Saint-Paul
Another OECD paper, by Høj et al. (2006), reports results indicating that big economic crises are associated with higher overall reforms, but in the cases of job protection and benefit systems reforms happen mostly in strong upswings. They also find that governments that have been in office for some time are more able to reform and that, on average, left-of-center governments reform less. These authors also confirm the last two conclusions of Duval and Elmeskov (2005).

Serial reformers?
As discussed earlier, labor market reforms are hardly unknown in Spain. Thus, one could argue that, on top of the standard resistance to reform, Spain also suffers from reform fatigue. It is therefore instructive to compare the Spanish experience regarding employment protection with that of the three other major continental European economies -France, Germany, and Italy-to check if there are objective grounds for fatigue, i.e. to ask whether Spain has experienced an unusual frequency and/or intensity of labor market reforms. In Table 2  Are the reform frequency and intensity comparatively high? Table 2 shows that the frequency is similar, and if anything, reforms have been less flexibility-increasing, less structural, and more incremental, though slightly more complete than in the other countries. Also, note that close to 40% of reforms have been flexibility-reducing, a higher share than elsewhere, indicating a high degree of regulatory uncertainty for both employers and workers. Given this evidence, it is hard to argue thatthe Spanish citizenship to be more reform-fatigued than in the other major European economies. But it may still be that perceived insecurity is very high in Spain. Let us look at the data.

Perceptions of insecurity
Do Spanish workers feel very insecure in their jobs? At first blush, not really. In 2005 Spain ranked sixth in the share of respondents who strongly agreed with the statement "My job is secure", only below Denmark, Slovenia, Ireland, Romania, and the US, among 19 nations. 19 Though there surely are business cycle effects, note the lack of correlation with standard indices of employment rigidity: three of those high-security perception countries feature very lax EPL, whereas the other three have very stringent EPL. Indeed, 18 A reform is considered structural if it is comprehensive, addressing the broader design of existing systems, rather than their minor features. Two-tier measures involve only a fraction of the potentially eligible population, regardless of size of the reform. Discrete reforms are those entailing a change in an institution which is larger than one-tenth of the cross-country deviation in the intensity of the regulation in the middle year covered by the dataset, i.e. 1995 (which goes from 0 to 6). See Boeri (2011) 19 The other countries are Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom

Political support for reforms
What are voter attitudes regarding labor market reform? Table 3  The survey data reveal that there is indeed more resistance to labor market reform among Spanish nationals than among EU15 citizens, though all the shares are still above 50%. There is again a much larger gap between the 16-24 year olds and the 45-54 year olds in Spain (4.8 pp) than in the EU-15 (0.6 pp). It is also noticeable that the social groups that are more favorable to labor reform are low-skill employees and the unemployed, which are not the most politically influential.
Let us now look at what support could be expected from the insiders. As already pointed out, according to Saint-Paul (2002), labor reform is more likely to happen the higher is the exposure of insiders to the risk of job loss. Following the arguments given in Section 3, we shall consider that the insiders are those with permanent jobs, whereas temporary employees and the unemployed are outsiders. Moreover, among employees with permanent contracts, there are some with the old "ordinary" contract (entitled to 45 days' wages p.y.o.s., with a maximum of 42 months' wages in case of unfair dismissal) and entrants hired under the new, employment-promotion permanent contract (entitled to 33 days' wages p.y.o.s., with a maximum of 24 months' wages in case of unfair dismissal).
Since, as indicated above, the turnover rate of the latter is much higher than for the former, it is therefore unclear whether their interests regarding labor market reform are close to those of workers on ordinary contracts. The lesson to be drawn is that the 1994 and 1997 reforms took place at a time when outsiders outnumbered insiders (i.e., their incidence was above 50%). Then, as a result of these reforms and of the subsequent long expansionary phase from 1997 to 2007, the fall in unemployment and the rise in the use of permanent contracts for new hires implied a large reduction of the fraction of outsiders quite below 50%, which is consistent with the lack of major reforms during this period. Note that, even after the adverse employment effect of the Great Recession, the fraction of temporary workers and unemployed remains around 42% since most dismissed workers previously held a temporary contract, so that there has been a sizeable change in the composition of outsiders but not in its size. If we adopt the wider measure of outsiders that also includes workers under employment-promotion contracts, the fraction of outsiders gets closer to 50%, though in literal terms it is still below the majority. We therefore do not get a clear signal from this indicator on why another reform took place in 2010.
Alternatively, it is interesting to look at how employment losses have been distributed among workers according to contract type. As can be observed in Figure 8

What triggered labor reforms?
The extraordinary rise in unemployment in Spain since 2007 was insufficient to trigger labor market reform. Before and during the Great Recession, the Spanish Socialist government did not think that such a reform was necessary and stated that, in case one were to be undertaken, it would come from an agreement between the social partners, i.e. the two main labor unions and the employer's association. Talks were held between those partners for more than two years without any agreement. Hence, forced by the financial markets' external threat, the Government abruptly changed its views on the necessity of a labor market reform, and put some more pressure on social partners to reach an agreement. In early February 2010 the Government had issued a set of guidelines for EPL reform to be discussed by the social partners and to be used as the foundation for the reform. Nevertheless, as talks stalled, it went ahead with a reform that followed the same strategy of the previous ones, namely, mildly reducing dismissal costs and relaxing dismissal restrictions under the employment-promotion permanent contracts while doing the opposite for temporary contracts.
As to changes in the regulation of collective bargaining, the reform process and the results were similarly meager. After the EPL reform, trade unions called for a general strike on 29 September 2010, which was largely a failure. However, one month later a new Minister of Employment was appointed -a card-carrying member of one of the two main labor unions, who had attended the general strike demonstrations-, with the main goal of restoring the social dialogue. Then, some guidelines for the reform of collective bargaining were issued and the Government waited for the agreement between the social partners on collective bargaining reform. The agreement never came and the Government proceeded again with another mild reform in June 2011 (see below).

Contents of the reforms
At first glance, the 2010-2011 reform was quite comprehensive, affecting the following four areas: severance pay, hours reduction, active labor market policies, and collective bargaining. A summary of the key measures follows.
Firstly, in the area of individual dismissals, there were several noticeable changes: 1. In dismissals for economic reasons, current and expected losses or a persistent reduction in revenues were included as causes for fair dismissal. Other, broadlyunderstood, economic reasons -technological, organizational, and productive-were explicitly defined for the first time. Advance notice was reduced from 30 to 15 days.

2.
A new employment-promotion permanent contract was introduced, reducing the group of workers for whom it was not applicable and making applicable to this contract the express dismissal procedure, i.e. maximum severance pay of 33 days' wages p.y.o.s. to avoid going to court, with no advance notice and no payment of interim wages (previously firms paid 45 days through a disciplinary dismissal).
3. For temporary contracts, severance pay was raised progressively from 8 days of wages p.y.o.s. to 12 days (to be reached in 2015). 4. The duration of a sequence of temporary contracts of a given worker in the same firm was capped at 3 years for hitherto unlimited specific-work contracts. 20 Secondly, in line with the successful experience of the Kurzarbeit programme in Germany, hours reductions were facilitated, by reducing social security contributions on firms and cancelling the subtraction from workers' entitlements of any unemployment benefits received due to hours reductions.
Thirdly, in the realm of active labor market policies, the groups of workers eligible for subsidies on job creation were restricted and private placement agencies were authorized for the first time.
Lastly, regarding collective bargaining, firms in distress were allowed to opt out of the industry collective-bargain wage level by reaching an agreement with its workers, though the corresponding level had to be achieved again in no more than 3 years. The additional reform of collective bargaining in June 2011 established that firm-level agreements have precedence over the corresponding industry-wide agreements, though this rule applies only if the latter does not say otherwise. Also, over the subsequent year, agreements that expire without a renewal by consensus being feasible will need to be subject to arbitration (until industry-wide agreements decide on whether this should be the rule).

What kind of reforms?
As mentioned earlier, in our view, labor reform was triggered by external pressure coming from international financial markets. We are not the first to argue about this channel for reform. Bertola (2010b) indicates that countries suffering high public debt are more likely to undertake labor reforms and finds some empirical evidence weakly supporting this claim. While causation is clear for countries that had to be bailed out, i.e. Greece and Portugal (whose respective Memorandum of Understanding with the ECB-EU-IMF troika include very specific labor market reform measures), it is not so apparent for non-bailed out countries.
The source of the reform does matter. Since neither the Government nor the social partners were interested in the reform, the kind of reform that was undertaken did not significantly reduce the fundamental insider-outsider divide in the Spanish labor market.
Firstly, the reform included measures that labor unions disliked, but it was made more palatable by reducing its scope. Indeed, the two most important institutions generating high and volatile unemployment, but which also benefit both employers and labor unions, were modified but in a sufficiently marginal way that their core was left in place. These are the dual EPL (see Saint-Paul, 2000) and the regulation of collective bargaining (subject to the caveat that current status quo may unravel if the social partners do not reach an agreement to preserve it, which may be in the interest of the employers' association).
Secondly, some of the measures introduced were meant to benefit insiders, such as the subsidies for reduced hours (as opposed to dismissals). Lastly, some of the measures have been subsequently undone, backtracking on limitations on the chaining of temporary contracts (see the footnote to item 4 in the preceding subsection) and raising the chances that workers will challenge individual dimissals in court. 21 It is still too early to assess the effect of these reforms, though the prospects are far from good. The latest forecasts at the time of writing this paper are that employment may fall again in 2011Q4 (at an annual rate of -1.5%), that unemployment may exceed 5 million at the end of this year, and that bargained wage growth remains at 2.7% while core consumer price inflation is around 1.5% and the GDP deflator around 2%. In view of these adverse circumstances, in the next section we propose a set of measures of labor market reform that we believe should be undertaken to help reverse the insider-outsider nature of the Spanish labor market, so as to permanently reduce its unemployment rate.

Towards eliminating the insider-outsider divide
As argued in the previous sections, despite a long sequence of unsuccessful reforms at the margin, the very high and persistent segmentation prevailing in the Spanish labor market since the late 1980s is the key factor behind its huge employment and unemployment volatility. Temporary contracts do not only bear the brunt of the adjustment during recessions but they also negatively affect the career developments and labor productivity of temporary workers (typically young, female, and low-skill), who face a low probability of advancing towards a long-term employment relationship.
Given these negative effects, clearly illustrated by the evolution of the Spanish labor market since the onset of the Great Recession, there is a growing consensus among academics that more reforms at the margin, like the one approved in 2010-2011, are bound to remain ineffective. On the one hand, timid attempts to reduce severance pay for some permanent contracts that are not available for all workers still leave a too high firing cost gap, as reflected by the scarce use of the new employment-promotion contracts. On the other, moving back to the labor market of a few decades ago by severely penalizing the use of temporary contracts while keeping the current levels of EPL for permanent contracts is not a viable option either. This would just prevent job creation in the subsequent recovery and make the labor market uniformly much more rigid. Thus, a more radical approach 21 In the October 2011 law regulating the social jurisdiction. is needed to reduce the firing cost gap between permanent and temporary workers, thus paving the way to a quality job-rich recovery and, foremost, to a better balance between flexibility and social protection. More specifically, new regulations need to be introduced so as to provide a viable alternative for firms to the overuse of temporary contracts, with the key goal of eliminating the detrimental effects of the excessive churning of temporary workers on job stability, training, and future career prospects.

A single open-ended contract
In parallel with a few other similar policy initiatives in Europe, a manifesto signed by 100 academic economists, see Andrés et al. (2009), was launched in Spain defending the idea of eliminating the firing cost gap once and for all. 22 To achieve this goal, a key policy advice in this proposal is the introduction of a single open-ended contract (SOEC hereafter) for new hires, at the same time that temporary contracts -with the exception of replacement contracts for maternity or sickness/disability leaves-are abolished. The key feature of SOEC is that it has no ex-ante time limit (unlike fixed-term contracts) and that severance payments smoothly increase with seniority, instead of having the same indemnity per year of service applying from the first day after the end of a short probation period (unlike current open-ended contracts). In this fashion, and in contrast with the current regulation of permanent contracts, the SOEC provides a sufficiently long entry phase and a smooth rise in protection as job tenure increases. The rationale for this gradually increasing profile of severance pay is that the longer a worker stays in a given firm, the larger is her/his loss of specific human capital, as well as the psychological costs suffered in case of dismissal. 23 A substantial advantage of SOEC over the current dual EPL regulation is that it drastically reduces the marginal cost, in term of expected severance pay, faced by employers when deciding whether to upgrade expiring temporary contracts into permanent ones.
This large reduction in the marginal cost of contract extensions (of 2 or 3 days' wages 22 Among these proposals are those of Blanchard and Tirole (2003) and Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) for France, Boeri  Further, to estimate the relevant EPL gap in each country, they adopt the conservative view that what matters in order to measure the effects of firing costs on employment is not legal severance pay per se, which is a transfer from the firm to the worker and may therefore be compensated for in the wage bargain. 25 Rather, what matter are other costs generated by third agents, like labor courts and labor authorities, which cannot be appropriated by firms and workers and therefore cannot be neutralized through wage bargaining. These are the so-called red tape costs, which they estimate to be 50% higher in Spain than in France. In view of this large firing cost gap, the research question they address is by how much would Spanish unemployment have been reduced during the Great Recession, relative to its actual rise, had Spain adopted the lower French EPL gap before the start of the slump, instead of keeping its own EPL regulations.
Their strategy is to calibrate the above-mentioned analytical model to match the main  Overall, these results indicate that facilitating the widespread use of flexible temporary contracts is more likely to raise unemployment on average over the business cycle in labor markets already regulated by rather stringent permanent job security provisions due to the inefficient turnover of temporary workers. 25 See Lazear (1990). The intuition behind this result is that while new permanent jobs must have relatively high productivity (to compensate firms for future high severance pay), in temporary jobs with low or no dismissal costs firms are instead willing to hire workers with lower productivity. Hence, the latter jobs become very fragile as soon as there is an adverse shock.
In other words, the stock of fragile jobs accumulates rapidly in expansions and becomes immediately destroyed when a recession hits. According to these results, introducing a single contract would unambiguously reduce volatility but, by hampering the hiring of low productivity workers, it would also increase unemployment by 2 pp (from 10% to 12% during the calibration period). Their simulations show that, in order to avoid this rise in unemployment, average firing costs would have to fall by 60% over the sample period.
Interestingly, as discussed above, this reduction in average firing costs turns out to be quite similar to the one implied by the introduction of SOEC 12-36. García Pérez and Osuna (2011) in their counterfactual simulations of general equilibrium search and matching models, it is assumed that the firing rate under SOEC will be on average 60% lower than those observed for temporary workers with less than 4 years of job tenure and 35% higher for permanent workers with job tenure above 4 years. The latter is assumed to capture the potential adverse effect of a SOEC reform exclusively applied to new workers (i.e. not retroactively) on workers with old permanent contracts, through a replacement of these workers -entitled to high firing costs-by new contracts under the cheaper SOEC. The main finding of these (partial equilibrium) models is that SOEC 12-24+ F3 provides on average 15% higher severance pay for workers than under the status quo and 13% more than under a pure SOEC 12-36, while the average firing cost to firms over the 10 year period is more or less the same. Thus, the mixed proposal of a SOEC and a capitalization fund seems to be a more beneficial alternative in order to reduce the degree of segmentation in the Spanish labor market via its effects on job duration, job mobility, and greater incentives to invest in human capital.

Other policy proposals
A SOEC would not be the cure-all for the Spanish labor market. The extremely high unemployment rates that have been reached are the result of a systemic failure, involving also the structure of collective bargaining, unemployment benefits, and active labor market policies. In this section we briefly review appropriate lines of reform in those areas.
Among the many government policies that can affect wage developments (public sector Hence, regulatory reforms should affect collective bargaining practices in order to bring wages more in line with productivity changes. This requires giving more scope to firmlevel bargaining, even for those firms within the coverage of industry-wide agreements, and limiting the use of wage indexation rules. As indicated in Section 5, the labor reforms of June 2010 and June 2011 did introduce eased the opt-out of industry agreements and established firm-level agreements as the default ones. However, by giving labor unions and the employers' association an effective veto over this change, it is not clear whether these changes will deliver a significant increase in the degree of decentralization.
We strongly believe that the SOEC and making opting-out of sectorial collective bargaining truly operational would eliminate the insider-outsider divide, and that this would bring very positive consequences in terms of job creation, giving scope to most-needed productivity gains and, last but not least, reducing earnings inequality among Spanish workers. The two fundamental measures that we advocate would surely need further refinements and being complemented by others geared towards reducing long-term unemployment, such as introducing some degree of experience-rating in unemployment benefits and improving the effectiveness of active labor market policies, by means of proper evaluation of their effects with financial consequences for the agencies in charge of the administration of those policies. 27

Conclusions
The Spanish economy is currently in a dire situation. Reducing the indebtedness of the private and public sectors is urgent, as external financial conditions are very unfavorable.
As monetary policy, within the Monetary Union, is out of domestic control, and fiscal policy is constrained by the financial conditions, supply policies should take the most prominent role in the policy agenda. It is urgent to increase productivity growth, while at the same time creating jobs, so as to make the reduction of indebtedness less painful in terms of consumption, to domestically provide new funds for investment, and to restore the competitiveness lost since the access to the EMU.
Labor market reforms are key to restart productivity growth. We do not believe that they are also sufficient, as there are many other areas in which structural reforms should be contemplated. Two important points that policy-makers need to consider are: 1. Labor market reforms and product market reforms ease the needed for fiscal consolidation process (see Gavilán et al., 2010). Reducing the insider-outsider divide and lowering barriers to competition in the product market would substantially increase job creation and productivity growth, so that fiscal revenues would be larger and public 27  deficits and debt could be further reduced with a lower cost in terms of consumption.
2. Be aware of reform fatigue. As shown above, there have been far too many unsuccessful and contradictory labor market reforms. The new labor market reform will have to be implemented in the context of a very intense fiscal retrenchment, and with the public opinion being very critical of the poor management of the consequences of the crisis so far. In this context, it is crucial that the reform has clear goals, be communicated clearly to the public opinion, and being perceived as equitable.
The task is not easy, but its time has come.